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   Introduction
The datalink layer of a telecommunication protocol is veried and proofchecked The proto
col has been designed to communicate messages of arbitrary length over unreliable channels
The messages are transmitted in small packets or frames  The protocol does not rely on fair
ness of data transmission channels ie repeated transmission of a frame does not guarantee
its eventual arrival For this reason the number of retransmission attempts is limited and
the protocol is called Bounded Retransmission Protocol
Reliable communication protocols are vital to the telecommunication industry They are
also of increasing importance to the electronics business because more and more products
consist of communicating subsystems and because many products integrate technology from
the elds of computers telecommunication devices and consumer electronics The pressure
for reliability of the protocols involved poses an important challenge to verication techniques
Design implementation and testing of communication protocols is a complicated and error
prone activity For many protocolbased products erroneous protocol behavior is met by
errorrecovery procedures or by issuing a new software release For some products however
error situations are not acceptable and software maintenance is impossible Correctness of
protocols is usually examined by careful testing of implementations
Thorough testing increases condence but testing is only semidecidable it may reveal the
presence of errors but not the absence of errors Protocol verication is required to obtain
a higher degree of condence The protocol is modeled in a mathematical structure and
correctness is guaranteed by showing that the protocol satises the required behavior under
all circumstances Verication is not restricted to implementations but can also be applied
to designs that have not yet been implemented It should be stressed however that although
verication excludes design errors it cannot replace testing of implementations
A handwritten protocol verication may itself contain certain errors that can be elim
inated by computer tools Verication errors can be classied into two categories wrong
assumptions and wrong deductions corresponding to errors in the protocol model and to
errors in its correctness proof respectively Errors of the rst type are the responsibility
of the modeler Errors of the second type can be eliminated using computer tools for proof
development or proofchecking There is an additional advantage to the use of computer tools
in protocol verication Protocol verication is a labourintensive and a nontrivial activity
much eort of skilled experts is required With the current stateoftheart it is costeective
only for those parts of	 protocols that are truly critical Computer tools will enable more
e
cient verication of protocols
In this paper we describe a verication and the associated proofchecking of a simplied
and stylized version of a Philips telecommunication protocol First the protocol is proven
correct using the inputoutput automaton model of Lynch and Tuttle  a formalism based
on extended nite state machines Next the verication is proofchecked in type theory with
the Coq system  The objective of this work is twofold The rst objective is to prove
correctness of the protocol with the highest possible level of condence The second objective
of this work is to bring to light all technical issues that are involved in obtaining this result
A starting point for the work described here was an algebraic specication of the protocol in
PSF  a language based on process algebra This specication was developed and validated
using PSF simulation tools The PSF description was translated into IO automata theory
and a suitable correctness criterion was dened The protocol was veried by proving that
it satises the correctness criterion This specication and verication were then translated
into type theory and checked with the Coq proof development system
This paper is divided into the following parts Section  gives an informal description of
the protocol Next Section  explains the verication of the protocol Section  discusses
the proofchecking with the Coq system Section  concludes with a discussion of the results
 Protocol Outline
Like most data link protocols the Bounded Retransmission Protocol can be regarded as
an extended version of the Alternating Bit Protocol The protocol uses a stopandwait
approach known as positive acknowledgement with retransmission  after transmission
of a frame the sender waits for an acknowledgement before sending a new frame The protocol
procedures are similar to the LAPB link control procedures of the X protocol  for X
acknowledged mode and window size   viz one outstanding unacknowledged frame	
Incoming frames are checked for errors Correctly received frames are acknowledged while
erroneous frames are simply discarded If the acknowledgement fails to appear the sender
times out and retransmits the frame An alternating bit is used to detect duplication of a
frame Realtime aspects are limited to the use of timeouts to detect loss of frames and loss
of acknowledgements Three service primitives are oered by the protocol a request and
conrm service at the sender side and an indication service at the receiver side
  REQs	
The request service to transmit a nite list s of data Each datum will be transferred
in a separate message frame
  CONFc	 c  fC OKC NOT OKC DONT KNOWg	
The conrmation service that informs the sender about the result of a request
  c  C OK  the request has been dispatched successfully
  c  C NOT OK  the request has not been dispatched completely
  c  C DONT KNOW  the request may or may not have been handled completely
This situation only occurs when the last frame is sent but not acknowledged
  INDd i	 d a datum and i  fI FIRST I INCOMPLETE I OKg	
The indication service to pass a new frame to the receiver application
  i  I FIRST  the packet is the rst one of a message more data to follow
  i  I INCOMPLETE  the packet is an intermediate one more data to follow
  i  I OK  the packet is the last one of a series completing the transmission of a
message
  IND NOT OK
The indication service to report loss of contact to the sender Only part of a message
has been received
The protocol control procedures will be described by means of a sender S a receiver R
and two communication channels K and L Figure 	 We will assume that K and L are
lossy channels message frames are either lost or they arrive without corruption in the order
in which they are sent Messages can be communicated over ports REQ CONF F G A
B IND  A data frame consists of a datum preceded by a header with three information
bits named rst last and toggle rst last toggle datum	 Bits rst and last indicate if a
packet is the rst or last frame of a series respectively For a singleframe message both are
set toggle plays the role of alternating bit to distinguish between subsequent data frames
Acknowledgement frames consist of these three information bits only rst  last toggle	
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Figure  Bounded Retransmission Protocol
First consider a faultless transmission where no frames are lost Suppose the sender S
receives a request to transmit data d

   d
n
 REQd

  d
n
	 Here we will assume n
the cases n or n are similar A frame true false toggle d

	 is sent on port F  Chan
nel K passes on the frame to receiver R over port G R then issues an INDd

 I FIRST	
to port IND  and sends an acknowledgement frame true false toggle	 on port A which is
passed on by channel L to port B The acknowledgement frame consists of the header of the
data frame Upon receipt of the acknowledgement the sender transmits the second datum
false falsetoggle d

	 where toggle has ipped The receiver issues INDd

 I INCOMPLETE	
and acknowledges the frame false falsetoggle	 This procedure is repeated until the last
frame is sent with rstfalse lasttrue and datumd
n
 The receiver sends INDd
n
 I OK	
to report completion of the message and acknowledges receipt The sender then informs the
application of the successful dispatch of the transmission request with CONFC OK	
Now consider a transmission where data or acknowledgement frames are lost First we
take the senders point of view Upon sending a frame the sender S starts a timer t

and
waits until either the frame is acknowledged or the timer goes o If the acknowledgement is
received the timer is switched o and the next frame is sent The timer is attuned to exceed
the round trip time for sending a data frame and receipt of its acknowledgement If the timer
goes o no acknowledgement can come anymore and the frame is retransmitted
The number of retransmission attempts is bounded by a parameter max and if this max
imum number of retransmissions has been reached the sender gives up The conrmation
service is invoked in one of two ways if the data frame in question is not the last frame of a
series then CONFC NOT OK	 conrms failure of message transfer For the last data frame
a CONFC DONT KNOW	 is called there is no way the sender can tell if the last frame was
lost and never arrived or if its acknowledgement was lost
Finally consider the loss of frames from the receivers point of view Suppose a lost data
frame is not the rst one ie the receiver is expecting a data frame followup Upon receipt
of a data frame the receiver starts a timer t

and goes to a waiting state When a data frame
arrives it is acknowledged and timer t

is switched o If the data frame has a ipped toggle
then it is new and it is also indicated to the upper layers When no data frame arrives timer
t

goes o eventually and service IND NOT OK is called Timer t

will only go o if the
sender has aborted the transmission and therefore t

 maxt


 Verification
 IO Automata Theory
In this section we give a brief account of those parts of IO automata theory that we need
for the purposes of the paper For a more extensive introduction to the IO automata model
we refer to  
IO automata An action signature S is a triple inS	 outS	 intS		 of three disjoint sets
of respectively input actions output actions and internal actions The derived sets of external
actions locally controlled actions and actions of S are dened respectively by
extS	  inS	 outS	
localS	  outS	  intS	
actsS	  inS	 outS	  intS	
We say that S is nite if actsS	 is a nite set
An IO automaton A or inputoutput automaton	 consists of the following ve compo
nents
  an action signature sigA	
we will write inA	 for insigA		 outA	 for outsigA		 etc	
  a set statesA	 of states
  a nonempty set startA	  statesA	 of start states
  a set stepsA	  statesA	actsA	statesA	 of transitions with the property that
for every state s and input action a in inA	 there is a transition s a s
 
	 in stepsA	
  an equivalence relation partA	 on localA	 having at most countably many equivalence
classes
We let s s
 
 u u
 
 range over states and a over actions We write s
a
	
A
s
 
 or just s
a
	 s
 
if A is clear from the context as a shorthand for s a s
 
	  stepsA	
An action a is said to be enabled in a state s if s
a
	 s
 
for some s
 
 Since every input action
is enabled in every state IO automata are said to be input enabled The intuition behind
the inputenabling condition is that input actions are under control of the environment and
that the system that is modeled by an IO automaton cannot prevent the environment from
doing these actions The partition partA	 describes what intuitively are the components
of the system and will be used to dene fairness
Composition Intuitively the composition of a collection of IO automata is their Cartesian
product with the added requirement that automata synchronize the performance of shared
actions This synchronization models communication between system components if a is an
output action of A and an input action of B then the simultaneous performance of a models
communication from A to B Since we do not want synchronization between output action
of dierent IO automata or synchronizations involving internal actions we require that the
IO automata are compatible in the sense that they do not share these actions
Formally we say that action signatures S

     S
n
are compatible if for all i j  f     ng
satisfying i 
 j outS
i
	  outS
j
	   and intS
i
	  actsS
j
	   We say that a number
of IO automata are compatible if their action signatures are compatible The composition
S 
Q
n
i
S
i
of a nite collection of compatible action signatures S

     S
n
is dened to be
the action signature with
  inS	 
S
n
i
inS
i
	
S
n
i
outS
i
	
  outS	 
S
n
i
outS
i
	
  intS	 
S
n
i
intS
i
	
The composition A  k
n
i
A
i
of a nite collection of compatible IO automata A

     A
n
is
the IO automaton dened as follows
  sigA	 
Q
n
i
sigA
i
	
  statesA	  statesA

	   statesA
n
	
  startA	  startA

	   startA
n
	
  stepsA	 is the set of triples s a

s
 
	 in statesA	actsA	statesA	 such that for all
  i  n if a  actsA
i
	 then si
a
	
A
i

s
 
i else si 

s
 
i
  partA	 
S
n
i
partA
i
	
Notice thatA is an IO automaton indeed startA	 is nonempty because all the sets startA
i
	
are nonempty A is input enabled because all the automataA
i
are input enabled and partA	
is a partition of localA	 We will sometimes write A

k   kA
n
for k
n
i
A
i

Hiding If S is an action signature and I  outS	 then the action signature HIDE I IN S
is dened as the triple inS	 outS	  I  intS	  I 	 If A is an IO automaton and I 
outA	 then HIDE I IN A is the IO automaton obtained from A by replacing sigA	 by
HIDE I IN sigA	 and leaving all the other components unchanged
Traces and fair traces Let A be an IO automaton An execution fragment of A is a nite
or innite alternating sequence s

a

s

a

s

   of states and actions of A beginning with a
state and if it is nite also ending with a state such that for all i s
i
a
i 
	 s
i
 An execution
of A is an execution fragment that begins with a start state A state s of A is reachable if it
is the nal state of some nite execution of A
Suppose   s

a

s

a

s

   is an execution fragment of A Then the trace of  is the
subsequence of a

a

   consisting of the external actions of A With traces

A	 we denote
the set of traces of nite executions of A For s s
 
states of A and  a nite sequence of
external actions of A we dene s


A
s
 
i A has a nite execution fragment with rst state
s last state s
 
and trace 
A fair execution of an IO automaton A is dened to be an execution  of A such that the
following conditions hold for each class C of partA	
 If  is nite then no action of C is enabled in the nal state of 
 If  is innite then either  contains innitely many occurrences of actions from C or
 contains innitely many occurrences of states in which no action from C is enabled
This says that a fair execution gives fair turns to each class of partA	 and therefore to each
component of the system being modeled A state of A is said to be quiescent if only input
actions are enabled in this state Intuitively in a quiescent state the system is waiting for an
input from the environment A nite execution is fair if and only if its nal state is quiescent
We denote the set of traces of fair executions of A by fairtracesA	 Also we write qtracesA	
for the set of traces of nite fair executions of A
Safety deadlock freeness and implementation Let A and B be IO automata with the same
input and output actions respectively Then we say that
  A is safe with respect to B i traces

A	  traces

B	
  A is deadlock free with respect to B i qtracesA	  qtracesB	
  A implements B i fairtracesA	  fairtracesB	
If A is safe with respect to B then all nite behaviors of A are allowed by B Thus A may
still have behaviors that are not allowed by B but these are all innite and so it cannot be
concluded from a nite observation that A violates the requirements imposed by B
Because in IO automata input actions are always enabled they will typically not have
deadlocks in the sense of states without any outgoing transitions Instead we dene deadlock
freeness as a relation between IO automata If A is deadlock free with respect to B this
means that whenever it is possible to reach a quiescent state of A via some trace we can also
reach a quiescent state of B with the same trace Thus A can only become inactive when
this is allowed by B
In IO automata theory inclusion of fair traces is commonly used as implementation re
lation Intuitively one may think of B as dening a set of constraints which A must obey
Note that A does not need exhibit all of the behaviors in fairtracesB	 merely a subset is
su
cient However by requiring that A and B have the same input actions and since input
actions must always be enabled trivial implementations are excluded Here it is important to
note that the concept of fairness used within the IO automata model is feasible in the sense
of  each nite execution of an IO automaton can be extended to a fair execution for
instance by giving turns in a roundrobin way to all classes that are continuously enabled	
As a consequence it also follows that A implements B implies that A is safe with respect to
B In general A implements B does not imply that A is deadlock free with respect to B
This is because a quiescent execution of A may be matched by a divergent fair execution of
B ie an innite execution in which after some point only internal actions occur However
it is easy to see that the implication does hold if B is divergence free in the sense that it has
no divergent fair executions
Renements In the literature a whole menagerie of socalled simulation techniques has
been proposed to prove that the set of nite quiescent fair  	 traces of one automaton is
included in that of another We refer to  for an overview and for further references In
this paper we only need a very simple type of simulation which is called weak renement
Let A and B be IO automata with the same input and output actions respectively A
weak renement from A to B is a function r from statesA	 to statesB	 such that
 If s  startA	 then rs	  startB	
 If s is a reachable state of A and s
a
	
A
s
 
 then rs	


B
rs
 
	 where  equals a if
a  extA	 and is empty otherwise
Lemma  If there exists a weak renement from A to B then A is safe with respect to B
Proof Easy
The converse implication does not hold ie there exist IO automata A and B such that
A is safe with respect to B but no weak renement from A to B can be given In those cases
one has to use other more general simulations Also if there exists a weak renement from
A to B then it is not in general the case that A is deadlock free with respect to B or that
A implements B However in the protocol that we analyze in this paper we will establish a
weak renement that maps quiescent executions to quiescent executions and fair executions
to fair executions and these additional properties immediately imply absence of deadlock
and the implementation relation
The preconditioneect style In the IO automata approach the automata that model the
basic building blocks of a system are usually specied in the socalled preconditioneect
style In this section we will briey describe the syntax of this language
We start from a typed signature  together with a algebra A which gives meaning to
the function and constant symbols in  To describe properties we use a rstorder language
over signature  and a set V of typed	 variables with equality and inequality predicates
and the usual logical connectives If  is a valuation of variables in their domains and b is a
formula then we write A  j b if b holds in A under valuation  A formula b is satisable
if there exists a valuations  such that A  j b
An IO automaton generator G consists of ve components
  a nite action signature sigG	
  a nite set varsG	 of typed	 state variables
  a satisable formula initG	 in which variables from varsG	 may occur free
  for each action a  actsG	 a transition type ie an expression of the form
a y
 
     y
n

Precondition
b
Eect
x
 
 e
 



x
m
 e
m
where the y
i
are typed	 variables b is a formula in which variables from varsG	 
fy

     y
n
g may occur free and which is true if a  inG	 varsG	  fx

     x
m
g
and the e
j
are expressions with the same type as x
j
 in which the variables varsG	 
fy

     y
n
g may occur
  an equivalence relation partA	 on localG	
Each IO automaton generator G denotes an IO automaton A in the obvious way states of
A are interpretations of the variables of varsG	 in their domains start states of A are those
states that satisfy formula initG	 for each input output or internal	 action a  actsG	
with a transition type as above and for each choice of values v

     v
n
taken from the domains
of y

     y
n
 respectively A contains an input output or internal	 action av

     v
n
	 A
has a transition
s
av

v
n

	 s
 
i there exists a valuation  such that
  for all x  varsG	 x	  sx	
  for   i  n y
i
	  v
i

  A  j b and
  for   j  m e
j
evaluates to s
 
x
j
	 under 
partG	 trivially induces a partition on localA	
Let a  actsG	 be an action with a transition type as above We dene the formulas
enableda	 and quiescentG	 by
enableda	

 y

     y
n
 b
quiescentG	



aactsG
enableda	
It follows that a state s of the automaton associated to G is quiescent i it satises formula
quiescentG	
The reader will observe that the translation from IO automata generators to IO automata
is quite straightforward In fact Lynch and Tuttle   do not even bother to distinguish
between these two levels of description For the formalization of IO automata theory in Coq
the distinction between the semantic and syntactic levels is of course important which is
why we have discussed it here The denition of IO automata generators has been inspired
by similar denitions in the work of Jonsson see for instance 	 In the sequel we will
like Lynch and Tuttle often refer to IO automata when we actually mean IO automata
generators
	

	 Protocol Specication
In this section we present the formal specication of the Bounded Retransmission Protocol
Following a brief description of the manysorted algebra that we use we will rst give IO
automata for each of the components of the protocol and then dene the full protocol as
the composition of these IO automata At the end of this section we will moreover present
the denition of an IO automaton that gives the intended external behavior of the protocol
Since the BRP protocol has been explained already in considerable detail in Section  we
will not repeat that explanation here and conne ourselves in this section to the formal
denitions together with a brief discussion of some of the notation and certain modeling
assumptions
Data types We start the specication of the protocol with a description of the various data
types that play a role We assume a typed signature  and a algebra A which consist of
the following components
  a type Bool of booleans with constant symbols true and false and a standard repertoire
of function symbols   		 all with the standard interpretation over the booleans
Also we require for all types S in  an equality inequality and ifthenelse function
symbol with the usual interpretation
  SS	 Bool

  SS	 Bool
if  then  else   BoolSS	 S
Note the harmless	 overloading of the constants and function symbols of type Bool
with the propositional connectives used in formulas We will frequently view boolean
valued expressions as formulas ie we use b as an abbreviation of btrue
  a typeNat of natural numbers with constant symbol  successor function symbol succ
and function symbol   NatNat	 Bool all with the usual interpretation We also
need a constant symbol max which denotes the maximum number of retransmissions
within the protocol
  a typeData of data elements that the protocol has to transmit We nd it convenient to
assume the presence of a constant symbol  of type Data which denotes the undened
data element
  a type List of nite lists over the domain of Data with a constant symbol 	 denoting
the empty list and a function symbol add DataList	 List denoting the operation
of prexing a list with a data element Besides these constructors there are function
symbols hd  List	 Data tl  List	 List and one  List	 Bool hd takes the rst
element of a list tl returns the remainder of a list after removal of the rst element
and one returns true i the argument list has length one These operations are fully
characterized by the axioms where s is a variable of type List and d e are variables
of type Data	
		
hd		   one		  false
hdaddd s		  d oneaddd 			  true
tl		  	 oneaddd adde s			  false
tladdd s		  s
  a type Conf of conrmation messages with constant symbols C NOT OK C OK and
C DONT KNOW
  a type Ind of indication messages with constant symbols I FIRST I INCOMPLETE and
I OK
  a type Spc of program counter values of the sender with constant symbols SF WA
SC ET  and WT 
  a type Rpc of program counter values of the receiver with constant symbols WF SI
SA RTS and NOK
The intended meaning of all these constants will be explained further on in this section We
assume that the interpretation ofConf  Ind Spc and Rpc is free in the sense that for each
of these types dierent constants symbols are mapped to dierent elements in their domain
no confusion	 and each element in the domain is denoted by some constant symbol no
junk	
Notation In the presentation below we use the following conventions
  We omit the precondition of an input action since this equals true by denition	
  In the eect part of transition types we omit assignments of the form x  x
  We write if c then z

 f

     z
k
 f
k
 as an abbreviation for
z

 if c then f

else z




z
k
 if c then f
k
else z
k
  We never mention the partition of the local action types because in all IO automata
generators that we consider it is trivial in the sense that there is just only block which
contains all the locally controlled actions Note that the composition of the IO au
tomata denoted by these generators will not have a trivial partition	
  We write pc  fSFWA SCg for pcSF  pcWA  pcSC etc
  To improve readability we sometimes use Lamports list notation for conjunction Thus
we write
 b

 b




 b
n
for b

 b

    b
n

	 
The sender We will now present the IO automaton S which models the sender of the
protocol An important state variable of S is pc which gives the current value of the program
counter of the sender This variable which is of type Spc may have ve dierent values
  SF Send a Frame at port F 
  WA Wait for an Acknowledgement to arrive at port B 
  SC Send a Conrmation message to the upper layer
  ET  Enable Timer  and
  WT  Wait for Timeout of Timer 
We have modeled the arrival of a request REQ	 as an input action since it is clearly under
control of the environment However once we have taken this decision the IO automata
model forces us to specify for all possible states what happens if an REQ action occurs
In our modeling the sender discards an incoming request if it is busy handling the previous
request something which is recorded by the boolean state variable busy 
T is a time out action that occurs when S wants to send a frame into channel K but
does not succeed because other agents not specied here	 are using the channel After the
occurrence of a T action S will send a conrmationmessage C DONT KNOW or C NOT OK
When S sends a frame into channelK by doing F  it simultaneously starts a timer by setting
boolean state variable timer on to true This timer will timeout if an acknowledgement for
the frame does not arrive in time Since we cannot explicitly model realtime aspects in
the IO automata model we deal with this timing behavior in a dierent way Under the
assumptions that 	 the transmission of a frame through channels K and L takes a bounded
time and 	 R will always acknowledge an incoming frame in a bounded time and 	 the
timer is set properly a timeout will occur i a frame gets lost in channel K or in channel
L Thus one could say that the loss of a message in the channel causes a timeout action
In our specication we have made these causal links visible by introducing output actions
EK and EL for channels K and L respectively which occur when a message gets lost
and corresponding input actions EK and EL of sender S whose occurrence sets a boolean
state variable timer enabled  By taking timer enabled to be part of the precondition of
the timeout action T  this gives us the desired causal links
If something goes wrong during the handling of a request and S sends a C DONT KNOW
or C NOT OK conrmation message then before dealing with a new request S will wait
long enough to make sure that the receiver R is prepared to receive new frames Also here
since we cannot deal with realtime directly within our model we describe the causal links
that result from these realtime constraints After sending a C DONT KNOW or C NOT OK
conrmation message the sender does an output action E	  which corresponds to starting a
new timer that is not specied here	 Since it depends on the state of R when this timer will
timeout E	 is made into an input action of R At the appropriate moment R will generate
the timeout action T	 for the timer started by S so that S can proceed and handle the next
request
We now give the code for IO automaton S
	
Input REQ B EK ELT
Output CONF F E
Internal T T
State Variables pc Spc
busyrsttoggle Bool
list List
timer on Bool
timer enabled Bool
rn Nat
Initialization   pcSF
  busy
  rst
  timer on
  timer enabled
  rn
REQ s  List
Eect
if busy   s  then list  s
busy  true	
F  f  Bool l  Bool t  Bool d Data
Precondition
pcSF   busy  
frst   lone list   ttoggle   dhd list
Eect
pc  WA
timer on  true
rn  succ rn
T
Precondition
pcSF   busy
Eect
pc  SC
EK
Eect
timer enabled  true
EL
Eect
timer enabled  true
B f  Bool l  Bool t  Bool
Eect
pc  if one list then SC else SF
rst  one list
toggle  toggle
timer on  false
list  tl list
if  one list then rn  	
T
Precondition
timer on   timer enabled
Eect
pc  if rnmax then SF else SC
timer on  false
timer enabled  false
CONF  c  Conf
Precondition
pcSC   cif list then C OK else
if one list   rn  then C DONT KNOW else C NOT OK
Eect
pc  if list then SF else ET
busy  false
list  
rn  
E
Precondition
pcET
Eect
pc  WT
rst  true
toggle  toggle
T
Eect
pc  SF
	
Channel K IO automaton K models in a straightforward way the behavior of a faulty
message buer with input channel F  output channel G  and capacity one Messages that
arrive when the buer is full are discarded In Lemma  we will show that actually such a
situation never occurs during a run of the protocol
Input F
Output G EK
State Variables fullrstlasttoggle Bool
datum Data
Initialization full
F  f  Bool l  Bool t  Bool d Data
Eect
if full then full  true
rst  f
last  l
toggle  t
datum  d	
G f  Bool l  Bool t  Bool d Data
Precondition
full   frst   llast   ttoggle   ddatum
Eect
full  false
EK
Precondition
full
Eect
full  false
Channel L IO automaton L is the same as K except that L handles frames that consist
of  instead of  elds and its actions have dierent names
Input A
Output B EL
State Variables fullrstlasttoggle Bool Initialization full
A f  Bool l  Bool t  Bool
Eect
if full then full  true
rst  f
last  l
toggle  t	
B f  Bool l  Bool t  Bool
Precondition
full   frst   llast   ttoggle
Eect
full  false
EL
Precondition
full
Eect
full  false
The receiver The most important state variable of IO automaton R is pc which gives the
value of the program counter of the receiver This variable which is of type Rpc can have
ve possible values
  WF Wait for a Frame to arrive at port G
  SI Send an Indication message to the upper layer
	
  SA Send an Acknowledgement message at port A
  RTS Return control bits of received frame To Sender via port A and
  NOK send an indication message NOT OK to the upper layer
The subtle part in the denition of R is again the part concerned with timing The receiver
has a timer of its own which is started at the moment an acknowledgement message is sent
by setting a boolean variable timer	 on to true The timer will time out if after some time
still no new frame has arrived at port G and it is clear that the sender has interrupted the
transmission a list When a timeout occurs the receiver sets ctoggle to false to indicate that
it will not reject the next frame on basis of its toggle bit and it generates an indication
NOT OK in case some messages have not yet been received If R has set the timer and S
generates an E	 action then a transmission has been interrupted and a timeout action may
occur For convenience we identify in our model E	 with the timeout action However if
an E	 action occurs and the receivers timer has not been set then this action should not
be interpreted as a timeout but just as a signal that an action T	 can be generated at the
sender side
We now present the code for IO automaton R
Input G E
Output A IND IND NOT OK T
State Variables pc Rpc
rsttogglectoggle Bool
rstastftoggle Bool
fdatum Data
timer on Bool
timer enabled Bool
Initialization   pcWF
  rst
  ctoggle
  timer on
  timer enabled
G f  Bool l  Bool t  Bool d Data
Eect
if pcWF then pc  if ctoggle  ttoggle then SI else RTS
rst  f
ast  l
ftoggle  t
fdatum  d
if ctoggle  ttoggle then timer on  false	 	
IND d Data i  Ind
Precondition
pcSI   dfdatum
  iif ast then I OK else  if rst then I FIRST else I INCOMPLETE
Eect
pc  SA
rst  ast
ctoggle  true
toggle  ftoggle
	
A f  Bool l  Bool t  Bool
Precondition
pcfSARTSg   frst   last   tftoggle
Eect
if pcSA then timer on  true	
pc  WF
IND NOT OK
Precondition
pcNOK
Eect
pc  WF
rst  true
timer on  true
E
Eect
timer enabled  true
if timer on then ctoggle  false
if rst then pc  NOK
timer on  false	 	
T
Precondition
timer enabled   pcWF
Eect
timer enabled  false
The full protocol IO automaton BRP is dened as the parallel composition of IO au
tomata SK L and R with all communication between these components hidden
BRP

 HIDE I IN SkKkLkR	
where I

 fF f l t d	Gf l t d	Af l t	Bf l t	EK ELE	 T	
j f l t in domain Bool d in domain Datag
The correctness criterion We specify the collection of allowed behaviors of the Bounded
Retransmission Protocol via an IO automaton P  which has the same input and output
actions as BRP  but no internal actions If a REQs	 action occurs in the initial state then
the regular behavior of P is to output the elements of s one by one tagging the rst datum
with an indication I FIRST intermediate data with I INCOMPLETE and the last datum with
I OK After sending the last datum P generates a conrmation message C OK to indicate
that the request has been carried out successfully and return to its initial state Requests
that arrive at a time when the previous request has not yet been processed are ignored
While a request is being processed something may go wrong at any point and instead of
the C OK message a C DONT KNOW or a C NOT OK conrmation message may be sent
The C DONT KNOW message will only occur however if at most one data element has not
been delivered and the C NOT OK will only occur if at least one data element has not been
delivered If a C NOT OK or C DONT KNOW message is sent somewhere in the middle of
the processing of a request ie after the rst but before the last data element has been
delivered P generates a NOT OK message After such a message P returns to its initial
state except if it has just received a new request which will then be processed
Below we present the code of IO automaton P  In the next section we will establish that
BRP is an implementation of P 
Input REQ
Output IND  IND NOT OK CONF
	
State Variables busyrsterror Bool
list List
Initialization   busy
  rst
  error
REQ s  List
Eect
if busy   s  then busy  true
list  s	
IND d Data i  Ind
Precondition
busy   error   list    dhd list
  iif one list then I OK else  if rst then I FIRST else I INCOMPLETE
Eect
rst  one list
list  tl list
CONF  c  Conf
Precondition
busy   error
   cC OK list
   cC DONT KNOW  list  one list
   cC NOT OK list 
Eect
busy  false
error  rst
list  
IND NOT OK
Precondition
error
Eect
rst  true
error  false
 Protocol Correctness Proof
Invariants In order to establish a weak renement from BRP to P we must rst gain insight
into what are the reachable states of BRP  To this end we present a number of invariants of
the protocol ie properties that are valid for all reachable states Most of these invariants
are proved by a routine induction on the length of the executions to the reachable states
The full handwritten proofs of the invariants together occupy about  pages of ASCII text
We used numbering of assertions as advocated by Lamport  although due to the fact
that the proofs went rarely more than  levels deep we found it easier to use explicit names
like  instead of the implicit ones like hi As an illustration we have included the full
proof of the invariant INVR Lemma 	 In order to distinguish between the state variables
of dierent components of BRP  we prex each state variable by the name of the component
it originates from
Lemma  The following property INV is an invariant of BRP
 SpcfSF SCET g 	 RpcWF
 Stimer enabled 	 SpcWA RpcWF  Kfull  Lfull
 Kfull 	 SpcWA RpcWF  Lfull
 RpcfSI SARTSg 	 SpcWA
 Rtimer	 enabled 	 SpcWT  RpcfWFNOKg  Kfull  Lfull
 Lfull 	 SpcWA RpcWF  Kfull
	
Invariant INV relates the control variables of the dierent components of the protocol The
invariant already allows us to make several important observations on the behavior of the
protocol The third clause implies that sender S will never send a frame into channel K
when the channel is busy delivering another frame Similarly receiver R will never send a
frame into channel L when L already contains a frame Thus the protocol does not need
communication channels with a buering capacity of more than one Clause three and six
together give that there will never be a message in both K and L at the same time Thus
an implementation of the protocol may use a single bidirectional medium to implement both
channels If channel L delivers a frame to the sender S then S is in fact waiting for this
frame to arrive Similarly if channel K delivers a frame to receiver R then the receiver is
waiting for this frame It follows rather directly from invariant INV that in each reachable
state of the protocol at most one of the four components enables a locally controlled action
This means that the protocol operates in a is fully sequential way
The second invariant INVS  stated in Lemma  gives some relationships among the state
variables of the sender The proof is by a a routine inductive argument that uses Lemma 
Since the actions in which S does not participate trivially preserve the validity of INVS  one
only has to establish that INVS holds initially and is preserved by the actions of S
Lemma  The following property INVS is an invariant of BRP
 SpcfWA SCg 	 Sbusy
 SpcWA 	 Stimer on  Srn 

 Slist	 	 SpcfSFET WT g  Sbusy	  SpcSC
 SpcfET WT g 	 Srn
 Srn 
 	 Sbusy
 SpcSC  Slist	 	 Srst
Invariants INVK and INVRS  stated in Lemma  and Lemma  deal with the ow of
information from sender to receiver via channel K
Lemma  The following property INVK is an invariant of BRP
Kfull 	 KrstSrst KlastoneSlist	 
KtoggleStoggle KdatumhdSlist	
Lemma  The following property INVRS is an invariant of BRP
RpcfSI SARTSg 	 R
rstSrst RastoneSlist	 
RftoggleStoggle RfdatumhdSlist	
Invariants INVR of Lemma  gives some relationships between the state variables of R
Lemma  The following property INVR is an invariant of BRP
 RpcNOK 	 Rctoggle
 RpcSI 	 Rctoggle 	 RftoggleRtoggle
 RpcfRTS SAg 	 Rctoggle Rftoggle 
Rtoggle
	
Proof Let s
 
be a reachable state of BRP  By induction on the length n of the shortest
execution of BRP that ends in s
 
 we prove s
 
j INVR If n   then s
 
is a start state
Hence s
 
j RpcWF which implies s
 
j INVR
For the induction step suppose that s
 
is reachable via an execution with length n  
Then there exists a state s that is reachable via an execution of length n and s
a
	 s
 
 for
some action a By induction hypothesis s j INVR We prove s
 
j INVR by a routine case
distinction on a In the proof we will use several times that by Lemma  s j INV 
 Assume a is an action in which R does not participate Then s
 
j INVR trivially
follows from s j INVR and the observation that a does not change any of the state
variables mentioned in INVR
 Assume a  Gf l t d	
	 s j Kfull by  and precondition G	
	 s j RpcWF by  and INV 	
	 Assume s j Rctoggle 	 tRtoggle
	 s
 
j Rctoggle 	 tRtoggle by  and  since G does not
change Rctoggle and Rtoggle	
	 s
 
j RpcSI Rftogglet by    and eect G	
	 s
 
j INVR by  and 	
	 Assume s 
j Rctoggle 	 tRtoggle
	 s
 
j Rctoggle 	 tRtoggle	 by  and  since G does not
change Rctoggle and Rtoggle	
	 s
 
j RpcRTS  Rftogglet by    and eect G	
	 s
 
j INVR by  and 	
	 s
 
j INVR by  and 	
 Assume a  INDd i	
	 s
 
j RpcSA  Rctoggle Rftoggle 
Rtoggle by  and eect IND	
	 s
 
j INVR by 	
 Assume a  Af l t	
	 s
 
j RpcWF by  and eect A	
	 s
 
j INVR by 	
 Assume a  E	
	 s j SpcET  by  and precondition E	 	
	 s j RpcWF by  and INV	
	 Assume s j Rtimer	 on  Rrst
	 s
 
j RpcNOK  Rctoggle by   and eect E	 	
	 s
 
j INVR by 	
	 Assume s 
j Rtimer	 on  Rrst
	 s
 
j RpcWF by    and eect E	 	
	 s
 
j INVR by 	
	 s
 
j INVR by  and 	
 

 Assume a  T	
	 s j RpcWF by  and precondition T	 	
	 s
 
j RpcWF by   and eect T	 	
	 s
 
j INVR by 	
 Assume a  IND NOT OK
	 s
 
j RpcWF by  and eect IND NOT OK 	
	 s
 
j INVR by 	
! s
 
j INVR by 	
The invariants INVR
 
and INVR
  
of Lemmas  and ! respectively give some additional
relationships between the state variables of R
Lemma  The following property INVR
 
is an invariant of BRP
 RpcWF 	 Rctoggle 	 Rtimer	 on
 Rtimer	 on 	 RpcfWFRTSg
 RpcRTS 	 Rtimer	 on
Lemma 	 The following property INVR
  
is an invariant of BRP
RpcfWFRTSg 	 Rrst Rtimer	 on
The next invariant INVL implies that when an acknowledgement message arrives at the
sender the three bits of this acknowledgement are determined by the state of the sender and
hence provide no information The only information conveyed by an acknowledgement is the
fact of its arrival itself the rest is redundant
Lemma 
 The following property INVL is an invariant of BRP
Lfull 	 LrstR
rstSrst  LlastRastoneSlist	 
Rctoggle  LtoggleRtoggleStoggle
Invariant INVS
 
below says that in certain states the sender knows the values of the
toggle variables at the receiver side
Lemma  The following property INVS
 
is an invariant of BRP
 SpcSC  Slist	 	 Rctoggle  StoggleRtoggle
 SpcfSF SCg  Srn 	 Rctoggle 	 StoggleRtoggle
 SpcWT  	 Rctoggle
Lemma  The following property INVS
  
is an invariant of BRP
Slist	 	 SpcET   Rctoggle 	 StoggleRtoggle	
Proof By direct combination of INVS and INVS
 

 	
Lemma  The following property INVFIRST is an invariant of BRP
 RpcNOK 	 Srst
 Srn 
 Rctoggle  Stoggle 
Rtoggle 	 RrstoneSlist	
SrstR
rst
 Rctoggle 	 StoggleRtoggle	  Rpc 
NOK 	 SrstRrst
Lemma  The following property INVRFIRST is an invariant of BRP
 SpcSC  Slist	 	 Rrst
 RpcSI 	 RrstR
rst
Proof By combination of INV  INVS INVS
 
 INVR INVRS and INVFIRST 
The following invariant is not used in the proof of the renement but is interesting because
it implies that when a frame arrives at the receiver the rst eld of this frame is determined
by the state of the receiver and the other elds of the frame Hence the rst bit of the frame
conveys no information and is redundant
Lemma  The following property INVK
 
is an invariant of BRP
Kfull 	 Krstif Rctoggle 	 KtoggleRtoggle	 then Rrst else R
rst
Proof By combination of INV  INVK  INVS and INVFIRST 
Safety We have now prepared the ground for the rst main results of this paper the exis
tence of a weak renement from BRP to P  Since states of BRP and P are fully determined
by the values of their state variables we can dene a weak renement from BRP to P by
expressing the values of the state variables of P in terms of those of BRP  The weak re
nement function which is given in Theorem  turns out to be surprisingly simple Plist
is either Slist or tlSlist	 Pbusy is just Sbusy Prst is just Rrst and Perror holds
i the receivers program counter equals NOK or will necessarily do so after the next locally
controlled action
Theorem  The function REF dened by the following formula is a weak renement from
BRP to P 
 Plist  if SpcfET WT g  Rctoggle 	 StoggleRtoggle	 then Slist
else tlSlist	
 Pbusy  Sbusy
 Prst  Rrst
 Perror  RpcNOK  SpcET   Rtimer	 on  Rrst	
Proof Given the invariants established above the proof is a routine exercise However this
still takes almost  pages densely lled with ASCII
Corollary  BRP is safe with respect to P 
Proof Immediate from Theorem  and Lemma 
  
Deadlock freeness In order to establish that BRP is deadlock free with respect to P  we
need an additional invariant
Lemma  The following property INVD is an invariant of BRP
 SpcWT  	 Rtimer	 enabled
 RpcNOK 	 SpcWT 
 SpcWA RpcWF 	 Kfull  Lfull  Stimer enabled
Theorem 	 For each reachable and quiescent state s of BRP REFs	 is a quiescent state
of P 
Proof Use invariants INVD and INVS 
	 s j Rpc 
SI since s j enabledIND		
	 s j Rpc 
SA Rpc 
RTS since s j enabledA		
	 s j Rpc 
NOK since s j enabledIND NOT OK 		
	 s j RpcWF by   and 	
	 s j Spc 
SC since s j enabledCONF		
	 s j Spc 
ET 	 since s j enabledE	 		
	 s j Rtimer	 enabled by  and s j enabledT			
!	 s j Spc 
WT  by  and s j INVD	
	 s j SpcWA	 Stimer on by INVS	
	 s j Stimer on  Stimer enabled	 by enabledT	
	 s j Kfull since s j enabledG		
	 s j Lfull since s j enabledB		
	 s j Spc 
WA by      and s j INVD	
	 s j SpcSF by   ! and 	
	 s j SpcSF  Sbusy	 since s j enabledT		
	 s j Sbusy by  and 	
	 REF s	 j Pbusy  Perror by    and denition REF 	
!	 REF s	 j quiescentP	 by  and inspection of
local transition types P 	
Corollary 
 BRP is deadlock free with respect to P 
Proof By Theorems  and ! we can construct for each quiescent execution of BRP  a
corresponding quiescent execution of P with the same trace
Implementation We now come to the main result of this section which says that the
Bounded Retransmission Protocol correctly implementation specication P  Given that we
have already shown that BRP is safe and deadlock free the essential fact that remains to be
established is that BRP is divergence free ie will always eventually produce some allowed
output after a given input As is usual with liveness properties we show this by presenting
a weight function that maps states onto a wellfounded domain the natural numbers in our
 
case	 and demonstrating that after an input all actions except possible further inputs and
the required outputs decrease the weight
For each state s of BRP  dene weights	 as the result of evaluating the following expression
in s
max 	  lengthSlist	    max 
"
 Srn	  
Stimer on	
   
SpcET 	    
SpcWT 	  
Spc  fSFWAg	
   
Kfull	
   
RpcSI	    
Rpc  fSARTSg	  
RpcNOK	
 
Lfull	
Besides some standard arithmetic operations we have used here a function length  List 	
Nat which gives the length of a list and a function 
  Bool	 Nat dened by

false	   
true	  
Lemma  The following property INVM is an invariant of BRP
 Srnsuccmax	
 SpcSF 	 Srnmax
Lemma  Suppose s s
 
are reachable states of BRP and s
a
	 s
 
for some action a with
a 
 inBRP	 and a not of the form CONFc	 for some c Then weights	  weights
 
	
Proof By a routine case distinction on a using invariants INV  INVS and INVM 
Theorem  BRP implements P 
Proof Assume that   fairtracesBRP	 We must prove   fairtracesP	
Let   s

a

s

a

s

   be a fair execution of BRP with trace 
If  is nite then  is quiescent and it follows by Corollary  that P has a quiescent execu
tion with trace  Since each quiescent execution is also fair this implies   fairtracesP	
So we may assume wlog that  is innite
Using the fact that REF is a weak renement Theorem 	 we can easily construct an
execution 
 
of P with trace  It remains to prove that 
 
is fair For this we distinguish
between two cases
First assume that  contains innitely many CONF actions Since partP	 contains only
one class and execution 
 
contains innitely many occurrences of actions from that class

 
is fair
Next assume that  contains only nitely many CONF actions Call an input action a
i
in
 discarded if s
i
 s
i
 Then between any pair of nondiscarded inputs in  there must be a
CONF action because a nondiscarded input always changes Sbusy from false to true and
CONF is the only action that can set Sbusy to false again Thus there is a point N in  after
which there are no more CONF actions and moreover all inputs are discarded By Lemma 
it follows that for all i  N  if a
i
is a locally controlled action then weights
i
	  weights
i
	
else weights
i
	  weights
i
	 Thus there must be a point M  N after which  only
 
contains discarded inputs Moreover all states from that point on are equal and quiescent
otherwise  would not be fair By Lemma ! Sbusyfalse for all quiescent states of BRP 
It follows that  has an innite su
x s
M
REQ		s
M
REQ		s
M
   But this means that the
corresponding execution 
 
of P has an innite su
x s
q
REQ		 s
q
REQ		 s
q
   Moreover
by Lemma ! state s
q
is quiescent This implies that 
 
is fair
 ProofChecking
In this Section we report on the proofchecking of the protocol verication of Section  We
have checked the proofs of all the invariants except Lemma 	 the proof that REF is a
weak renement Theorem 	 and the proof that REF preserves quiescence Theorem !	
We did not proofcheck metaresults such as Lemma  and Corollaries  and  Also
we have not checked the liveness results of Lemma  and Theorem  Proofchecking
these results as well would have required a considerable eort with at least in the case of the
Bounded Retransmission Protocol only a small payo Still we think that the formalization
and mechanical checking of these type of results will be an important topic of future research
 Coq Proof Development System
Coq is a proof assistant for higherorder logic It is based on the Calculus of Inductive Con
structions  which is a polymorphic type theory allowing dependent types and inductive
types Constructing a proof in Coq is an interactive process The user species the proof
strategy eg which deduction rule should be applied	 and Coq does all the calculations
Notation Coq is based on type theory which means that apart from some built in pretty
printing rules	 all applications are denoted in prex In this paper we adapt the ASCII
input and output of Coq in order to improve the readability We write
x A  b for  xAb
x A B for xAB when x is a free variable in B
A

	 A

for AA	
x  y for eq A x y or 
Axy	
A  B for and A B or AB	
A  B for or A B or AB	
A B for prod A B or AB	
A for AFalse or A	
x 
 y for x  y	
Note that we omit the type information in x  y The reader can easily deduce this type
from the context
The Tactics theorem prover The Coq system makes use of the CurryHoward isomorphism
which states that terms can be used to encode natural deduction proofs For instance the
wellknown Scombinator
x A	 B 	 C	  y A	 B  z A  x z y z	
encodes under the CurryHoward isomorphism the following natural deduction proof Can
celled hypotheses are placed between square brackets	
 
 A	 B 	 C	 
	
 A 

B 	 C
 A	 B 

 A 

B
C

A	 C

A	 B		 A	 C	

A	 B 	 C			 A	 B		 A	 C		
In order to give the reader a avor of a proof session in Coq we give the list of commands tac
tics	 needed to construct the proofterm above At the right we expose how the proofterm is
built step by step Note that proofterm is constructed topdown The termsHyp

    Hyp


represent the subgoals that are generated during the proof session We omit the types in
the proofterm in order to save space	
Goal A	 B 	 C			 A	 B		 A	 C		 proofterm Hyp

Intros x y z proofterm xyzHyp

Apply x proofterm xyz x Hyp
	
Hyp

Assumption proofterm xyz x z Hyp

Apply y proofterm xyz x z y Hyp


	
Assumption proofterm xyz x z y z	
Tactics can be composed to so called tacticals The tactical tac

 tac

rst applies tac

on
the current goal and then applies tac

on all the subgoals generated by tac

 More generally
the tactical tac

 tac

j    jtac
N
 rst applies tac

and then applies tac
i
on the ith subgoal
generated by tac

i       N	 When tac

does not generate N subgoals this tactical
fails	 The following tactical generates the same Scombinator
Intros x y z  Apply x  Assumption j Apply y  Assumption
Details about the use of Coq can be found in the Coq manual 
One of the most important features of Coq is the so called program abstraction From a
proof of x A y B P x y	 one can extract a function program	 f  A 	 B such that
x A P x fx		 We do not need this facility for our purposes
Inductive types In our encodings we extensively use inductive types For details about this
notion we refer to  In this paper we restrict ourselves to some examples When we dene
nat  Set  O  nat and S  nat 	 nat then S    S
 z 
n
O		 is of type nat for all n   but there
might still be other terms of type nat In Coq we have the alternative possibility
nat  IndX Set	fX j X 	 Xg
O  Constr nat	
S  Constr nat	
which is the result of the Coq command
Inductive Denition nat  Set  O  nat j S  nat 	 nat
 
This should be read as nat is the smallest set X closed under two constructors one of type
X and one of type X 	 X  When we choose for the second option then nat contains no
other terms then those constructed from O and S In other words for arbitrary P  nat 	 
and x  nat we are able to construct a term of type P x from terms 
o
 P O and 
s
 y 
nat  P y 	 P S y	 This term is written as PMatch x with 
o

s
in the system The
reduction behavior of this term is determined by the construction of x from O and S
PMatch O with 
o

s
	 
o
PMatch S y with 
o

s
	 
s
y PMatch y with 
o

s
	
Note that this reductions are well typed ie reduction of a term does not change its type
When   Prop which is a predened notion of Coq representing the type of all propositions	
then P is a predicate over nat and 
o
and 
s
are just the usual proofs for the zerocase and
the successorcase When   Set another predened notion representing the type of all
sets	 and P is a constant function on nat say P  n  nat  A for some A  Set  then

o
 A and 
s
 nat 	 A 	 A and x  nat   P Match x with 
o

s
represents the
function from nat to A that is dened by primitive recursion from 
o
and 
s
 In other words
a A  g nat 	 A	 A  x nat  PMatch x with a g is a recursor With this mechanism
one can dene any primitive recursive function and even more because one can use higher
order recursion	
We conclude this subsection with the illustration of how one can use inductive types to
encode logical conjunction and disjunction Dene
and  AB  PropIndX Prop	fA	 B 	 Xg
or  AB  PropIndX Prop	fA	 X j B 	 Xg
conj  AB  PropConstr and A B		
or introl  AB  PropConstr or A B		
or intror  AB  PropConstr or A B		
then and A B	 contains no other terms proofs	 then those constructed from conj A B	
and or A B	 contains no other terms then those constructed from or introl A B	 or
or intror A B	 This exactly reects the intuitionistic meanings of conjunction and dis
junction The only way to prove AB is proving both A and B and the only way to prove
A  B is proving A or B
	 Protocol Specication
The handwritten proof is written in many sorted predicate logic For each sort there is an
equality relation We use the builtin encoding of polymorphic Leibniz equality
eq  A Set  a A  IndX A	 Prop	fX ag
to represent these equalities Furthermore we use the standard encodings for conjunction
and disjunction briey explained in the previous subsection The types Prop and Set also
mentioned in the previous subsection are predened notions constants	 of Coq comparable
with the star 	 in systems of the Barendregtcube  The logical implication and the
functional implication are both identied with the arrow of type theory As a consequence
our proof is intuitionistically valid	
There are at least two ways to encode the functional behavior of a function F  A 	 B
For instance the sum  Nat 	 Nat 	 Nat can be dened by
 
sum  nat 	 nat 	 nat
s

 x nat  sum O x  x
s

 x y nat  sum S y	 x  S sum y x	
In this case sum is just a variable without any computational power Computing the value
of sum n m	 can be done by the Coq command Rewrite s

 or Rewrite s

 depending on
the value of n The alternative is to dene sum as an abbreviation
sum  x y nat  z nat  natMatch x with y z nat  S 	
The advantage of the second approach is that one does not have to give any command for
computing the value of sum n m	 Computation in this case is just normalization and done
automatically by the system Note that Coq can not reduce sum n O	 to n when n is a
variable In such a case one can do a case analysis on n We try to use the second approach
as much as possible
In Coq it is allowed to omit the abstraction in PMatch x with    when P x does not
actually depend on x So natMatch x with    can replace z nat  natMatch x with   
in 	 In the sequel we will omit such abstractions
The main result in the handwritten proof is that there exists a weak renement from
automaton BRP to automaton P  We modied our encodings several times in order to get
a better formulation in Coq of this weak renement property In the approach that we have
chosen eventually we can represent the function REF  statesBRP	 	 statesP	 by a
term like in 	
Data types The specication of the Bounded Retransmission Protocol makes use of several
data types We represent these types by inhabitants of Set
  the sort Bool is represented by the inductive type
bool  IndX Set	fX j Xg
true  Constr bool	
false  Constr bool	
All functions on booleans can be represented by terms We will write
 x for boolMatch x with false true negation	
x  y for boolMatch x with y  y	 equality	
x 
 y for  x  y	 inequality	
x u y for boolMatch x with y false conjunction	
x t y for boolMatch x with true y disjunction	
  The sort Data is represented by the variable data  Set  Furthermore we dened a
variable Undened  data which represents the element   Data
  The sort List is dened as the inductive type with constructors NIL and ADD repre
senting 	 and add respectively In formula
 
LIST  IndX Set	fX j data 	 X 	 Xg
NIL  ConstrLIST	
ADD  ConstrLIST	
Functions like hd tl 	 and one can all be represented by terms For instance
one  L LIST  boolMatch L with
false
d data  y LIST  b bool  boolMatch y with
true
d data  y LIST  b bool  false
The equalities from Subsection  are satised All the righthandsides are just the
normal forms of the lefthandsides
  The nite sets Spc Rpc Conf and Ind are encoded as inductive types in the same
style as the booleans Some versions of Coq can not distinguish inductive types that have
the same structure Choosing dierent names for such types just introduces dierent
names for the same expression In particular nite sets that have the same cardinality
are not distinguished For instance Spc and Rpc are two abbreviations for the same
type IndX  Set	fX j X j X j X j Xg We can prove SF  WF by reexivity
because SF and WF are both the rst element of a set of ve elements A typing error

Rpc

R
x		  WA in one of the invariants was overlooked for a long time
Similar to the binary operators  and 
 on bool we have dened terms representing
 and 
 on Spc Rpc Conf and Ind
Note SF  WF  Prop and SF WF  bool 
The actions We dene nite sets act BRP and act P representing the sets of actions We
can not use the same name for actions of dierent automata Hence we add a prime 
 
	
by those action of automaton P that already occurred in automaton BRP Constructors of
act BRP are REQ  LIST 	 act BRP  F  bool 	 bool 	 bool 	 data 	 act BRP 
etc Elements of act P are REQ
 
 LIST 	 act P  etc We add an extra element  to the
inductive set act P Next we dene a term ev evaluate	 which maps actions of BRP to the
corresponding actions of P  REQ
ev
	 REQ
 
 etc	 Internal actions of BRP are mapped to
 
 
ev  a act BRP  act PMatch a with REQ
 
B

 B

 B
	
bool  d data  

B

 B

 B
	
bool  



CONF
 


B

 B

 B
	
bool  d data  
B

 B

 B
	
bool  
IND
 
INDn
 

Note that we simply postulate which actions are internal in automaton BRP One could
think of encoding whole the theory about input and output actions Given the status of the
actions in the components the status of the actions in the product automaton could then be
computed However this part of the handwritten proof is not the kind of reasoning where
automatic verication pays o
The state spaces The following step is the denition of types states BRP and states P
representing the state spaces of the two automata BRP and P  The state space of BRP is
encoded as a cartesian product of cartesian products states S  Spc  bool      bool 
LIST  nat  Analogously we dene states K states L and states R Now states BRP 
states S  states K  states L states R Finally states P  LIST  bool  bool  bool 
We use the standard inductive type prod  with constructor pair for the encoding of the
cartesian product When A and B are sets and a b	  A  B then a b	 is represented
in Coq by pair A B a b	 Hence a b c	  A  B  C is represented by pair A B 
C	 a pair B C b c		 which is already a bit less friendly An element of states BRP would cover
the whole page However we can represent a function F  A 	 B 	 C 	 A B  C	
such that F a	b	 maps c to a b c	 by a term in the style of 	
F  x A  y B  z C  pair A B  C	 x pair B C y z	
Then a b c	 can be represented by F a b c	 This way we dene functions st S st K st L
st R st BRP and st P mapping the components of the state spaces to the corresponding
elements in the cartesian products Furthermore we dene projection functions 
toggle

states S 	 bool  
R
 states BRP 	 states R etc For instance

toggle
st S B

B

B
	
B

B


L n	 	 B
	

R
st BRP S K L R	 		 R
The weak renement The mapping REF can now be represented by the term below


ref  x states BRP  st P
LISTMatch 
Spc

S
x	  ET	 t

Spc

S
x	 WT	 t
 
ctoggle

R
x	 t

toggle

S
x	  
toggle

R
x	
with 
list

S
x	 tl 
list

S
x			

busy

S
x	

rst

R
x	

Rpc

R
x	  NOK
t

Spc

S
x	  ET	 u

timer on

R
x	 u
 
rst

R
x			
The step relation The next step is the denition of types step  act BRP 	 states BRP 	
states BRP 	 Prop and step
 
 act P 	 states P 	 states P 	 Prop representing the
notion of step The intended meaning of step a s

s

is s

a
	 s

 We use an inductive type
again
step  IndX act BRP 	 states BRP 	 states BRP 	 Prop	f
 LIST  s Spc  B

 B

 B
	
 B

bool 
L LIST  n nat 
s
K
states K  s
L
states L  s
R
states R 
false  empty 		
XREQ 	
st BRP st S s false B

B

B
	
B

L n	 s
K
s
L
s
R
	
st BRP st S s true B

B

B
	
B

 n	 s
K
s
L
s
R
		
j



j   g
This enables us to do a case analysis on H when we have a proof H  step a s

s

	 in our
context and we want to prove s

 s

	 for some s

 s

 states BRP  The rst constructor of
step leads to the following subgoal
 LIST  s Spc  B

 B

 B
	
 B

bool 
L LIST  n nat 
s
K
states K  s
L
states L  s
R
states R 
st S s false B

B

B
	
B

L n	 s
K
s
L
s
R
	
st BRP st S s true B

B

B
	
B

 n	 s
K
s
L
s
R
		
This is the result of matching s

and s

with the terms of type states BRP on which X is
applied in the rst#constructor#case of step describing the behavior of the request action	
	
In our approach we encode directly how the actions aect the product automaton BRP
This way we avoid the problem of encoding how the composition of the automaton BRP out
of its components S K L and R is organized The fact that local actions that have the same
name are synchronized in the product automaton is di
cult to express
Some actions are split in more than one case For instance the action B is split into B 
with extra precondition onelist	true and B  with extra precondition onelist	false This
way we obtain  constructors for step
Reachability Reachability is encoded as an inductive type having two constructors The
rst constructor encodes the reachability of the initial state The second constructor encodes
the preservation of reach under step
reach  IndX states BRP 	 Prop	f
s states BRP  start s		 X s	
j a act BRP  s

 s

states BRP 
step a s

s

		 X s

		 X s

	g
where start is the predicate on states BRP that holds only for the initial state also dened
inductively
start  IndX states BRP 	 Prop	f
B

 B

 B
	
 B

 B


 B

 B

 B

 B

 B

 B

bool 
L LIST  d

 d

data 
X st BRP
st S SF false true B

false false L O	
st K B

B
	
B

false d

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Assume that we want to prove s

	 for some s

states BRP and that we have a proof
Rreach s

	 Eliminating the inductive type reach returns two subgoals
i	  s states BRP  start s		 s	
ii	  a act BRP  s

 s

states BRP 
step a s

s

		 reach s

		 s

		 s

	
The rst goal can be proved via Intros s H  Elim H and the second goal can be proved via
Intros a s

s

H  Elim H  which leads to proving reach s

	 	 s

	 	 s

	 by a case
analysis on the proofterm H of type step a s

s

	
The weak renement property Assume that we have in BRP a transition s

a
	 s

for some
external BRPaction a then we must have a transition REF s

	
a
	 REF s

	 in automaton
P  We are able to express this as
step a s

s

		 step
 
ev a	 ref s

	 ref s

		 	
When a is an internal action then 	 evaluates to
step a s

s

		 step
 
 ref s

	 ref s

		
 
which we can not prove for there are no constructors of the form step
 
    in the denition
of step
 
 When we add a constructor of type s  states P  step
 
 s s	 then we can prove
step a s

s

		 step
 
ref s

	 ref s

		 i we can prove ref s

	  ref s

	 This is exactly
what we required so 	 also encodes the weak renement property when a is internal
Of course 	 does not have to hold for states that can not be reached Hence we can
add an extra precondition Furthermore we quantify over the states and the action
a act BRP  s

 s

states BRP  reach s

		
step a s

s

		 step
 
ev a	 ref s

	 ref s

		 	
A weak renement mapping also has to map initial states to initial states This is encoded
as
s states BRP  start s		 start
 
ref s		 	
The invariants For proving 	 we have to use the invariants These invariants are proven
valid in the reachable states only Their formulation is rather straightforward Below we give
the encoded version of invariant INVR of Lemma  Note that the expression is prexed by
the precondition reach x	
invr  x states BRP  reach x		

Rpc

R
x	  NOK 	

ctoggle

R
x	  false


Rpc

R
x	  SI 	

ctoggle

R
x	  true 	

ftoggle

R
x	  
toggle

R
x	


Rpc

R
x	  RTS  
Rpc

R
x	  SA		

ctoggle

R
x	  true  
ftoggle

R
x	   
toggle

R
x			
 Correctness Proof
Goals Proofs of the invariants and the renement are essentially by induction over the
transitions and split in the corresponding  cases one initial state and  transition steps
have to be considered	 As is to be expected transitions that do not aect variables that
occur in an invariant prove in Coq simply by assumption with the induction hypothesis
Other cases resolve into further subgoals
In this application of IO automata most predicates are equality assertions over state
variables and the proofs involve much propositional reasoning This is best illustrated by
means of an example subgoal Figure  shows a Coq goal that occurs when proving invariant
INVR Lemma 	 After elimination of reachable states Section 	 Coq has lled in
the variables and terms in proper places in the states before and after the transition in
the precondition and in the invariant The assertion to prove is on top below that are
the assumptions This case corresponds to action G in case ctoggle 	 ttoggle	 The
latter condition is expressed by assumption H  Other preconditions of this transition arise
as equalities over state variables that have been lled in automatically in the states before

and after this transition H

and H

assume reachability of these states H

contains the
induction hypothesis for the invariant property The goal to prove is that the property holds
for states after a G step
The goal in Figure  decomposes in a number of subgoals Figure  focuses on a par
ticular subgoal The proposition occurs in the rightmost conjunction of the invariant viz
RpcfRTS SAg 	 Rftoggle 
Rtoggle H


assumes the precondition of this implication
The proof uses assumption H  The induction hypothesis H

in Figure 	 has been decom
posed into its constituent conjuncts Applications of projection functions in the goal and in
the assumptions have been reduced to retrieve the appropriate terms
Many of the goals and subgoals that occur while proving the invariants in this exercise
consist of a logical combination of equality statements The same observation holds for those
assumptions in the context that have not yet been eliminated and can be of relevance to the
unnished proof In nearly all these cases the equality statements are over elements from nite
sets This holds for preconditions of transition steps as well as for predicates in the invariants
The induction mechanism is often used in this exercise Induction serves two purposes
in the denition of a set it states that the given elements are the only inhabitants of the
set no junk property	 and it states that all elements are dierent no confusion property	
Inductively dened nite sets play an important role in the Coq checking of this verication
both to do analysis by cases as well as to distinguish between elements Analysis by cases
is provided directly in Coq via elimination of a variable over the elements of inductive set
Inequality of dierent elements of an inductively dened nite set is not directly available in
Coq but must be derived with the Match mechanism Because the verication described here
uses this type of reasoning extensively it will be illustrated by means of a small example We
inductively dene a nite set S and a predicate that discriminates its elements
Inductive Denition S  Set  a  S j b  S j c  S
Denition neq S  x y S  PropMatch x with
PropMatch y with False True True	
PropMatch y with True False True	
PropMatch y with True True False	
Ie neq S x y	 reduces to False if xya or xyb or xyc and it reduces to True
otherwise It serves to prove the desired inequalities ab	 ac	 etc Instead of deriving
and naming all n

lemmas for an nary set we prove the following generalized lemma to derive
contradictions
x y S  x  y		 neq S x y		 P Prop  P
Such a lemma is derived for all inductive sets Suppose the lemma is named absurd S  The
latter is then used extensively to resolve goals with an inconsistent equality assumption in
the context say ab The following Coq tactical solves such goals immediately
Apply absurd S a b	  Assumption j Simpl  Exact I  	
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Figure  Characteristic Coq subgoal for this application The assertion to prove is on top
the assumptions are below The goal forms part of the obligation to prove that transition
G preserves invariant INVR Lemma 	 H

assumes the invariant property holds for states
that enable this transition step The assertion to prove is that the property holds for states
after the transition
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Figure  A subgoal of the goal in Figure  The proof uses assumption H
For invariants that are proved by induction over transition steps sometimes a majority of
the subgoals prove by contradiction because they assume ab for dierent a and b from an
inductive set
Tacticals Both tactics and tacticals have been used in the proofchecking Coq
tacticals are composed of tactics and they can be used to apply at once a combination of rules
They can also be used to accomplish a limited form of proof search Such tacticals have been
written for ve of the invariants in this application One generic tactical was developed to
decompose and investigate several lemmas After case distinction over  cases initial state
and  transition steps	 the tactical attempts to decompose these cases by elimination of
logical connectives until only simple goals are left where the assertion to prove is an equality
assertion For our invariants typically some  simple goals are left then Many of these
are solved automatically by assumption reexivity or by means of an inconsistent equality
statement in the context For the invariants above only a handful of nontrivial goals then
remain to be solved by the user
To achieve a form of search the tacticals are mainly composed of combinations of the 
and Orelse tacticals explained below
tactical

 tactical

 tactical
	

This applies tactical

to the subgoals generated by tactical

and tactical
	
to those that are
generated by tactical


tactical

Orelse tactical

Orelse tactical
	
This tries to apply tactical

 If that fails tactical

is applied If that fails tactical
	
is applied
Coq tactical building blocks are fairly elementary A denition mechanism or parameteriza
tion is not provided This could be convenient for this application since it would allow often
recurring tacticals like 	 to be written very compactly
The current Coq tactical language has no variables and pattern matching As a conse
quence tacticals must be tailored to the overall structure of goals if they are used for proof
search Because of this writing a tactical proof often is as much eort as writing the corre
sponding tactic proof Currently the advantage of such tacticals is mainly that it is easier
to adapt them than to adapt tactic proofs tactical proofs are less aected when invariants
or automata are modied
 Discussion
The main objectives of this work have been fullled the protocol has been veried and the
verication at least the safety part of it	 has been proofchecked Although the Bounded
Retransmission Protocol is small it is by no means trivial and the eorts involved are con
siderable While the PSF specication and simulation activity have been carried out in only
two manweeks the manual verication took roughly two manmonths including writeup	
and the proofchecking took more than three manmonths Part of the latter eort is due to a
learning eect Analysis of the Bounded Retransmission Protocol is not completed the orig
inal protocol has an additional disconnect service that allows the sender and the receiver to
disrupt an ongoing communication This service has been neglected here and will be veried
later Apart from this the protocol as described and veried in this paper contains most of
the characteristics of the real protocol It should be noted however that the model simplies
the realtime aspects of the protocol by the way timers are encoded We could have modeled
these realtime aspects more realistically by using a realtime extension of the IO automata
model see 	 but then the verication would have been much more involved
Importance of the verication The verication has answered a number of questions about the
protocol Foremost it proves that the data link protocol is free of design errors An important
result of the work is that it has corrected several inconsistencies ambiguities and omissions
in the semiformal original specication of the protocol For instance the exercise has pinned
down the behavior of the toggle bit between subsequent messages and has formalized many
assumptions that were previously left implicit In addition the correctness criterion given
in the IO automaton model formalizes the protocol service requirements ie the required
external behavior of the protocol
The automaton specication also serves as a precise functional description for protocol
implementations In this description all kind of important questions for implementors have
been answered like  Can I send an empty message$ How to respond if a request comes
before the previous request is completed$ What is the start value of the toggle bit for
subsequent messages$ These issues are important if protocol implementations have to be
developed by dierent programmers at dierent locations as is the case with this protocol

Other protocol properties are conrmed by the automaton model For instance invariant
INVK
 
Lemma 	 proves that the use of the bit named rst in data frames is redundant
because the receiver can always predict its value This is consistent with the situation in the
X LAPB protocol  that has no comparable eld and that uses a more data bit only
which corresponds to the inverted	 bit named last in the Bounded Retransmission Protocol
Further the automaton model conrms that the rst  last and toggle bits from the header
of acknowledgements are irrelevant for correctness
Proofchecking with Coq The experiences with the Coq system are positive The Coq system
! is robust and reliable and is welldocumented Most shortcomings are related to the
ASCII interface it is easy to lose the overall picture when dealing with large contexts and
large proofs
The Coq proofchecking conrms that the verication is correct It was not rsttime right
though and the proofchecking has corrected a number of draft versions Both the verica
tion and the specication have been revised several times Other corrections relate to various
errors and inaccuracies in versions of the manuscript proof Preliminary versions of six invari
ants required modication One invariant proved false and required weakening In four cases
the original invariants were probably valid but the proofchecking revealed that they needed
strengthening induction loading	 to admit a proof In several cases small modications to
the automaton were necessary to admit a missing proof Much of the checking was done while
parts of the proof were still under development and certain errors must therefore be ascribed
to the iterative approach that characterizes the development of automata proofs Usually the
manuscript proof was followed unless obvious simplications were seen For one invariant
the use of tacticals simplied a handwritten proof by abstaining from the application of two
other invariants that were used in the manuscript proof
If this application is characteristic of IO automata proofs % and this seems to be the
case % then IO automata verications could benet from proof search procedures Many
sub	proofs are truly elementary It must be stressed that this quality does not come for
free In IO automata verications the crucial and most di
cult part is nding the proper
automata the weak renement relation and the invariants This is an iterative process that
can benet from proof search support Proof search can be used in two ways it can speed
up the checking of manuscript proofs but it can also speed up their development The Coq
system is currently designed as a proofchecker and not as a theorem prover Accordingly
the system was used in this exercise to check versions of the manuscript proof and the system
was not explicitly exploited in the development of the proof The tacticals written for this
application indicate that it is feasible to reduce conjectures of invariants to a few nontrivial
or impossible subgoals for the user Most proof obligations in this application require very
specic and elementary reasoning It seems that additional tactical building blocks can be
of great help for future IO automata verications Such tacticals can facilitate the proof
checking but they may also be used in the development of the proofs
Modeling IO automata in type theory Modeling the Bounded Retransmission Protocol au
tomata the invariants and the weak renement proof in type theory Coqs Inductive Calculus
of Constructions	 posed no problem The translation into type theory that has been used
skips much of the generic notions of IO automata introduced in Section  like action sig

natures and explicit sets of states and transitions but instead directly encodes these notions
for this particular application An important question is if this encoding is satisfactory or
how it can be improved upon An advantage of the current mapping to type theory is that
it closely follows the application and directly supports the checking of the invariants and
the renement proof While this encoding thus facilitates the operational checking it also
amalgamates the automata theory and the application which makes it di
cult to reuse much
of the Coq text for other applications
An interesting option is to use a more general encoding of automata theory together with
a compact application description similar to the specication in Section  This can lead
to an approach that is more exible because it allows reuse of the theory part for dierent
applications Also the simpler application description is less errorprone The current en
coding is tailored towards the proving of invariants and weak renement relations Absence
of deadlock has to be dened specically for this application and cannot be reconstructed
easily from the transition steps In an approach that explicitly models the meta theory of
IO automata such properties can be dened independent of the particular application A
disadvantage of that approach is the extra theory level that enforces more elaborate and
indirect proofs Automatic translation of a combined meta theory encoding together with a
particular application description into one applicationspecic encoding seems desirable in
order to obtain the advantages of the latter The translation can be within Coq or part of a
preprocessor One may even want to use dierent translations for dierent purposes Some
of these options are currently investigated by the authors
Related work Recently there has been a growing interest in proofchecking protocol correct
ness proofs see for instance  ! Since it is impossible to give here a complete overview of
all the work in this area we will only mention some papers that are directly related to our
work either by the choice of the concurrency formalism or by the choice of the proofchecking
system
Nipkow  veried two implementations of a memory system and a mutual exclusion
algorithm using the theorem prover Isabelle  The verications were done both in a
setting of algebraic data types using data renement	 and in the IO automatonmodel using
simulation relations	 Loewenstein and Dill  veried a multiprocessor cache protocol using
simulation relations and HOL the HigherOrder Logic of  This case study is similar in
spirit to the one of Nipkow but more involved Engberg Gr&nning and Lamport  report
on a tool that translates proofs in Lamports Temporal Logic of Actions to input for LP the
Larch Prover of  A few simple examples were veried using the tool including a spanning
tree algorithm In these examples the mechanically checkable proofs written in the translator
were only two to three times longer than careful hand proofs S&gaardAndersen etal 
formalized a simple IO automata verication of a communication protocol using the LP
verication system They report that after all the basic machinery of the IO automata
model has been formalized as well as the basic data types employed by the protocol the
use of LP even leads to a reduction in the size of the proofs However their example is
quite simple there is no need to establish state invariants	 and it remains to generalize these
results to larger examples Bezem and Groote  have used Coq to check a verication of the
alternating bit protocol in process algebra Their proofs are essentially based on rewriting
Recently Groote and Van de Pol  have also veried the Bounded Retransmission Protocol

in process algebra using Coq Whether one prefers process algebra or the IO automatamodel
appears to be a matter of taste and in order to evaluate the relative merits of both approaches
we will have to consider more and bigger examples Martin Hofmann  in Edinburgh has
checked a verication of the Alternating Bit Protocol with LEGO ! His verication is
based on a functional approach and uses stream transformers
All of the above researchers arrive at approximately the same conclusion mechanically
checking of protocol verications is feasible and highly promising but the current proof
checkers are not optimal we need an improved user interface along the lines of 	 and
better proof search procedures
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